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Abstract
We studied family firms in the Japanese electric machinery industry.  First, we compared firm perfor-
mance between family and non-family firms, and found that family firms show higher profitability.  Sec-
ond, we tried to distinguish among reasons for better performance of family firms.  The results of several
t-tests and regression analyses suggest that selecting top management from the pool restricted to the
family is not an important disadvantage of family firms.  They also suggest that neither combining own-
ership and control nor holding large equity share is the advantage of family firms.  On the other hand,
family firms in the sample invest in capacity significantly more than non-family firms in the 1990s.
Therefore, longer investment horizons of family firms may be the reason for better performance, espe-
cially during the low growth era.
??Introduction
In contrast to Berle and Means's view that ownership is separated from management in modern corpo-
rations, several studies reported that family-owned firms are prevalent in the world.  Family businesses
occupy one third of Standard and Poor's 500 (Anderson et al., 2003).  Family firms comprise 80% to
90% of all business enterprises in North America, and employ 62% of the U.S. Workforce.  The ratios in
Asia, Europe, and South America are higher than in North America?.
Family ownership is widely believed to be less efficient than dispersed ownership.  Fama and Jensen
(1983) argue that the combining ownership and control may allow founding families to exchange profits
for private rents.  Demsetz (1983) discusses that founding families may choose nonpecuniary consump-
tion and draw scarce resources away from profitable projects.  Families also often choose CEO from the
pool restricted to family members, suggesting that difficulty to obtain qualified and capable talent con-
tinuously, potentially leading to competitive disadvantages relative to non-family firms (Anderson and
Reeb, 2003).
Nevertheless, several excellent companies in the world are family-owned firms.  Salvatore Ferragamo,
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? See Family Firm Institute Web site (http://www.ffi.org/).
for example, has been soundly managed in apparel industry without speculation or irrelevant diversifica-
tion.  Samsung Electronics, for example, has grown in semiconductor industries by aggressive invest-
ment.  Not only have case studies of individual firms but also systematic empirical analyses found better
performance of family firms.  McConaughy et al. (2001) find that family firms have greater value, are
operated more efficiently, and carry less debt than non-family firms.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) also
find that family firms perform better than non-family firms.
There are several literatures suggesting the benefits of family firms.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue
that family members with large equity share have substantial economic incentives to diminish agency
conflicts and maximize firm value.  James (1999) points out that families have longer investment hori-
zons, resulting in greater investment efficiency.  Stein (1988; 1989) discusses how the presence of share-
holders with relatively long investment horizons can mitigate the incentives for myopic investment deci-
sions by managers.
As described above, existing studies provide both advantages and disadvantages of family businesses,
while empirical analyses show better performance of family firms in the U.S. and Europe.  Thus, in this
paper, we will compare the performance between family and non-family firms in Japan.  Moreover,
many studies have compared performance between family and non-family firms, but few studies have
distinguished among the theories on why family firms perform better than non-family firms.   In this pa-
per, therefore, we compare the performance among different types of family-firms and analyze any dif-
ference in investment behavior between family and non-family firms.  By doing so, we explore why
family firms perform better.  In other words, we try to understand which benefit of family firms for their
better performance is more important.
The structure of this paper is as follows:  The next section briefly reviews existing studies on family
firms, and establishes several hypotheses.  Section III discusses the data and the method.  Section IV
shows the empirical results.  Section V discusses about the results and provides a summary and future
research agenda.
??Theories and Hypotheses
It is widely believed that founding families tend to take actions that benefit themselves at the expense
of firm performance.  Fama and Jensen (1985) argue that large shareholders employ different investment
decision rules from diversified shareholders, who are supposed to evaluate investments using market
value rules that maximize the value of the firms' residual cash flows.
Selecting CEO from the pool restricted to family members can be another reason for poor perfor-
mance of family firms relative to non-family firms.  Schleifer and Vishny (1987) suggest that large
shareholders remain active in management even if they are no longer competent and qualified to run the
firm.
Families can also expropriate wealth from the firm through excessive compensation, special divi-
dends, and so on.  Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that families have incentives to redistribute rents
from employees to themselves.  Family's action to maximize their personal utility potentially results in
poor firm performance relative to non-family firms.
On the other hand, several researchers point out the advantages of family firms.  Demsetz and Lehn
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(1985) argue that families have strong incentives to monitor managers and minimize the free rider prob-
lem inherent with atomistic shareholders, because the family' wealth is closely linked to firm welfare
and because the family have knowledge of the firm's technology necessary to monitor managers.
Families may be willing to invest in long-term projects because they have longer horizons than other
shareholders (Stein, 1988; 1989; James, 1999).  Since founding families regard their firms as an asset to
pass on to their descendants rather than wealth to consume during their lifetime, firm survival is an im-
portant concern for families.  Therefore, family firms may maximize long-term value (Casson, 1999).
Since existing literatures point out both advantages and disadvantages of family firms, we set two al-
ternative hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a:  Family firms perform better than non-family firms.
Hypothesis 1b:  Non-family firms perform better than family firms.
Supposing that we will find that family firms perform better than non-family firms (consistent with
Hypothesis 1a) like many existing empirical studies, we will explore why family firms perform well.
The disadvantages of family firms pointed out by existing studies are broadly classified into two: prodi-
gality or divergence from maximization of firm value and incompetent and unqualified managers chosen
from the restricted pool of family members.  This paper will examine the latter.
Founders may find it difficult to choose a qualified successor from their family. Therefore, firms run
by the founders perform better than those run by the successors from their family.  If families understand
such a disadvantage, they may search for a talented manager from larger pool.  As a result, they continue
to own their firms, but appoint CEO from outside the family.  If so, family firms run by non-family
members perform better than those run by the successors from the family.   Therefore, we set the follow-
ing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Firms run by the founders perform better than those run by the successors selected from
the family.
Hypothesis 3: Family firms run by non-family members perform better than those run by successors
from the family.
Existing studies pointed out two kinds of advantages of family firms: less agency conflict and longer
investment horizons.  If combining ownership and control, which mitigates agency conflict, is the reason
for better performance of family firms, firms not only owned by the families but also run by the CEO
from the family members should perform well.  In the firms owned by the families but run by CEO from
outside the family members, however, ownership is separated from management.  Therefore, they
should not perform as well as the family firms combining ownership and control.  Thus, we have the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 4: Family firms not only owned by the families but also run by the CEO from the family
members perform better than the firms owned by the families but run by the CEO from outside the family
members.
The reason for better performance of family firms may be not combining ownership and management
but large equity share owned by family.  Because the families who are large shareholders have strong in-
centives to monitor managers and mitigate agency problems, even firms owned by the family members
with large equity share but run by the CEO from outside the family members may perform well.  How-
ever this reason is not applied only to family firms.  Firms owned by large but non-family shareholders
should also perform well.  Thus, we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Firms owned by large but non-family shareholders perform as well as family firms.
If family firms have longer investment horizons, they can invest in long-term project non-family firms
cannot invest in.  As a result, family firms tend to make more aggressive investment.  Moreover, non-
family firms may adjust investment level to economic conditions frequently, while family firms are pa-
tient enough to keep their investment level.  Therefore, we set the hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 6: Family firms invest more than non-family firms.
Hypothesis 7: Family firms show more stable investment than non-family firms.
These hypotheses will be tested in this paper to compare the performance between family and non-
family firms, and distinguish among the reason for the better performance of family firms.
??Data and Methods
(1) Sample
In this study, we collected the data of the electric machinery manufacturers in Japan from 1992 to
2005, and examined their ownership structure, investment behavior, and firm performance.  We specified
the founding families of 248 large electronic equipment manufacturers in Japan?.  To construct other
variables described below, we collected the financial data of each firm between 1992 and 2005 from the
database of Nikkei Financial Quest. As a result, the data was collected for 190 out of 248 firms.
Then, we collected the data of the equity share of ten largest shareholders from Yuka Shoken
Hokoku-sho of each firm.  We regarded the shareholders whose family name is the same as that of the
founder, as founding family members, and considered that sum of the equity share of founding family
members is the family share?.  Moreover, we examined if the current president or chairman is the fami-
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? The data source is Nihon Kaisha-shi Soran (A Bibliography of Company History), Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha, 1995.  This
book summarizes the histories of 3072 important firms in Japan.
? If there are foundations or other organizations owned by family members, the equity share of them are counted in the
family share.  The data source is Oukabunushi Soran (A Bibliography of Large Shareholders), Toyo Keizai, 1994.
ly members.
Family businesses can be defined in terms of management and in term of ownership.  We have three
kinds of family business dummy variables.  First, FB1 is equal to 1 if the president or the chairman of
the firms is from the founding family, and 0 otherwise.  Second, FB2 is equal to 1 if family member is
listed in the top 10 shareholders, and 0 otherwise.  Third, FB3 is equal to 1 if the equity share of family
among the 10 largest shareholders is more than 5%, and 0 otherwise.  Out of 190 sample firms, 69 firms
are run by the founding family (FB1=1), 80 firms are owned by the family (FB2=1), and 51 firms are
largely owned by the family (FB3=1).
(2) Variables and Methods
First, to know if there is significant difference in performance between family and non-family firms
(Hypothesis 1a and 1b), we will perform t-tests for difference in means of performance.  As performance
measures, we construct the return on asset (ROAt) and the sales growth rate (AAGRt).  ROAt is the aver-
age of ROA of a firm in each year during the period t, and AAGRt is the average annual growth rate of
the sales during the period t.  We set the three periods: from 1992 to 2005 (whole sample period), from
1992 to 1998 (depression), and from 1999 to 2005 (recovery)?.
Second, we will examine if the selection of the top management from the pool restricted to the family
members causes a disadvantage of family firms.  To do so, we will divide the family firms run by found-
ing family members (FB1=1) into those run by the founders and those run by the successors of family
members.  Then, we will perform t-tests for difference in means of performance between the two (Hy-
pothesis 2).  If restricted pool causes a disadvantage, we expect that family firms run by the founder per-
form significantly better than those run by the successors of family members.  We will also divide fami-
ly firms into those run by the successor of family members (FB2=1 and Successor) and those run by
non-family members (FB2=1 and FB1=0), and will perform t-tests for difference in means of perfor-
mance (Hypothesis 3).  If restricted pool causes a disadvantage, we expect that family firms run by non-
family members perform significantly better than those run by the family members.
Third, we will examine if combining ownership and control is the advantage of family firms.  To do
so, we will perform t-tests for difference in means of performance between family firms not only owned
by the families but also run by the CEO from the family members (FB2=1 and FB1=1) and the firms
owned by the families but run by the CEO from outside the family members (FB2=1 and FB1=0) (Hy-
pothesis 4).
Fourth, we will examine if not combining ownership and management but large equity share resulting
in strong incentive to monitor managers is the advantage of family firms (Hypothesis 5).  To do so, we
will run the regressions.  Dependent variables are several kinds of performance measure described
above.  Independent variables are dummy variables of family firms owned by family members (FB2)
and equity share of the largest shareholders (Largest_Share).  If not being owned by family members but
being owned by large shareholders is the reason for better performance, Largest_Share as well as FB2
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? Japanese economy had suffered from long depression, “lost ten years,” as we call, since the collapse of the bubble
economy in 1992, and has recovered early 2000s.
should have significantly positive coefficient  We will also include several control variables described
below.
Finally, to examine any impacts of ownership structure on investment behavior, we will run the re-
gressions.  As dependent variables, two kinds of investment, R&D investment (RDRt and CVRDRt) and
capacity investment (CAPRt and CVCAPRt), will be examined.  RDRt is the average of R&D sales ratio
of a firm in each year during the period t, and CAPRt is the average of capacity investment divided by
sales of a firm in each year during the period t (t=1994-2005, 1994-1998, 1999-2005).  CVRDRt is the
coefficient of variation of R&D sales ratios in each year during the period t and CVCAPRt is the coeffi-
cient of variation of capacity investment divided by sales in each year during the period t.
Independent variables are family firm dummies such as FB1, FB2, and FB3.  In addition to them, we
will include several control variables. AGE is the number of years from the year when the firm was es-
tablished to 2005.  DEBTR is debt ratio.  EMP is the number of employees, which stands for the size of
the firm.  We also include ROAt and Largest_Share.  The mean, standard deviation, and correlation ma-
trix of the variables are indicated in Table 1.
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix, Mean, and Standard Deviation
 
1. AGE
2. Largest_Share
3. FB1
4. FB2
5. FB3
6. ROA92-05
7. AAGR92-05
8. DEBTR92-05
9. EMP92-05
10. AVERDR94-05
11. AVEINVR94-05
12. CVRDR94-05
13. CVINV94-05
Mean
Standard Deviation
 
1. AGE
2. Largest_Share
3. FB1
4. FB2
5. FB3
6. ROA92-98
7. AAGR92-98
8. DEBTR92-98
9. EMP92-98
10. AVERDR94-98
11. AVEINVR94-98
12. CVRDR94-98
13. CVINV94-98
Mean
Standard Deviation
 
1. AGE
2. Largest_Share
3. FB1
4. FB2
5. FB3
6. ROA99-05
7. AAGR99-05
8. DEBTR99-05
9. EMP99-05
10. AVERDR99-05
11. AVEINVR99-05
12. CVRDR99-05
13. CVINV99-05
Mean
Standard Deviation
1
-0.100 
-0.288 
-0.357 
-0.330 
-0.191 
-0.070 
0.083
0.311
-0.093 
-0.193 
0.090
-0.092 
59.088
16.090
1
-0.100 
-0.288 
-0.357 
-0.330 
-0.143 
-0.241 
0.060
0.315
-0.031 
-0.093 
0.068
-0.103 
59.088
16.090
1
-0.100 
-0.288 
-0.357 
-0.330 
-0.198 
-0.052 
0.094
0.302
-0.105 
-0.156 
0.062
-0.052 
59.088
16.090
2
-0.285 
-0.279 
-0.161 
-0.129 
-0.060 
0.069
-0.138 
-0.042 
-0.107 
-0.055 
-0.055 
20.082
16.559
2
-0.285 
-0.279 
-0.161 
-0.152 
-0.087 
0.081
-0.135 
0.005
-0.055 
-0.059 
-0.066 
20.082
16.559
2
-0.285 
-0.279 
-0.161 
-0.086 
-0.085 
0.059
-0.141 
-0.068 
-0.103 
0.058
0.008
20.082
16.559
3
0.673
0.596
0.200
0.118
0.002
-0.164 
-0.006 
0.079
0.096
0.026
0.356
0.480
3
0.673
0.596
0.208
0.101
-0.017 
-0.163 
0.005
0.060
0.103
0.042
0.356
0.480
3
0.673
0.596
0.150
0.105
0.015
-0.162 
-0.012 
0.092
-0.058 
-0.018 
0.356
0.480
4
0.725
0.241
0.028
-0.132 
-0.225 
-0.047 
0.034
0.077
0.026
0.405
0.492
4
0.725
0.248
0.150
-0.123 
-0.224 
-0.053 
0.093
0.093
0.065
0.405
0.492
4
0.725
0.182
0.018
-0.133 
-0.224 
-0.029 
0.008
-0.095 
-0.017 
0.405
0.492
5
0.165
-0.065 
-0.088 
-0.163 
-0.032 
0.040
0.105
0.083
0.263
0.442
5
0.178
0.057
-0.077 
-0.162 
-0.063 
0.144
0.117
0.146
0.263
0.442
5
0.120
-0.054 
-0.093 
-0.162 
-0.002 
-0.030 
-0.058 
0.040
0.263
0.442
6
0.196
-0.111 
-0.020 
0.058
0.238
-0.129 
-0.136 
0.834
3.572
6
0.624
-0.216 
0.019
-0.039 
0.173
-0.067 
-0.088 
0.839
3.088
6
0.140
-0.074 
-0.039 
0.110
0.288
-0.351 
-0.102 
0.873
5.001
7
-0.110 
0.021
0.096
-0.002 
-0.053 
-0.055 
-0.001 
0.086
7
-0.314 
0.039
0.068
0.199
-0.085 
-0.067 
0.006
0.056
7
-0.003 
-0.009 
0.127
-0.072 
-0.220 
-0.165 
-0.002 
0.097
8
-0.023 
-0.184 
-0.094 
0.016
0.050
221.415
722.158
8
-0.025 
-0.122 
-0.054 
-0.020 
-0.005 
218.088
614.073
8
-0.024 
-0.167 
-0.119 
0.268
0.088
225.143
867.144
9
0.188
0.004
-0.039 
-0.180 
3276.646
8879.345
9
0.214
0.011
-0.041 
-0.191 
3731.185
10461.754
9
0.147
0.013
-0.099
-0.158
2821.968
7390.866
10
0.124
-0.059 
-0.132 
0.047
0.031
10
0.114
-0.036 
-0.181 
0.050
0.037
10
0.045
-0.072
0.012
0.045
0.031
11
0.300
0.284
0.051
0.047
11
0.536
0.201
0.047
0.051
11
0.019
0.402
0.052
0.052
12
0.377
0.490
1.653
12
0.358
0.326
1.823
12
0.346
0.315
0.360
13
0.649
0.494
13
0.477
0.381
13
0.479
0.372
??Results
(1) T-Test
First, the results of the t-tests for difference in means of performance between family and non-family
firms are shown in Table 2.  Regarding ROA, any kinds of family firms perform significantly better than
non-family firms.  Regarding sales growth rate, the results are mixed.  The firms run by the family mem-
bers (FB1) grow significantly more than non-family firms from 1992 to 2005 and from 1999 to 2005,
but the difference in growth rate from 1992 to 1998 is insignificant.  The firms owned by the family
members (FB2) grow significantly more than non-family firms from 1992 to 1998 and from 1999 to
2005, but the difference in growth rate from 1992 to 2005 is insignificant.  The firms owned by the fami-
ly members with more than 5% of equity share (FB3) do not grow significantly more than non-family
firms during any periods.  Thus, Hypothesis 1a is clearly supported in terms of ROA, and partially sup-
ported in terms of sales growth rate, while Hypothesis 1b is rejected.  In sum, in the Japanese electric
machinery manufacturers, family firms perform better than non-family firms as the existing empirical
analyses in the different contexts found.
Second, the results of the t-tests for difference in means of performance between family firms run by
the founders and those run by the successors are shown in Table 3.  In terms of ROA as well as sales
growth rate, family firms run by the founders perform better than family firms run by the successors
from 1992 to 2005 and from 1992 to 1998.  Therefore, during these periods, Hypothesis 2 is supported.
This suggests that the family may have difficulty to obtain qualified and capable CEO from the pool re-
stricted to the family members.
However, the difference in performance may not be caused by the difference between founders and suc-
cessors.  Family firms run by the founders are relatively young.  Therefore, better performance of the fami-
ly firms run by the founders may be caused not by the difference in top management (founders vs. succes-
sors) but by the difference in youth.  Insignificant difference in performance from 1999 to 2005 when age
difference between the two kinds of firms relatively decreases is consistent with the latter interpretation.
The results of another test examining if selection of managers from restricted pool of family members
is the disadvantage of family firms are indicated in Table 4.  Different from the results in Table 3, any
specifications in Table 4 do not show significant difference.  That is, there is no significant difference in
performance between family owned firms run by the successors from family members and those run by
non-family members.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 is rejected.  Expanding the pool of managers to outside fami-
lies does not improve performance.  This suggests that the pool restricted to the family members does
not cause disadvantages of family firms.
Third, we performed several tests to examine if combining ownership and control is the reason for
better performance of family firms.  One is the t-tests for difference in means of performance between
firms owned by family and run by family members (FB2=1 and FB1=1) and firms owned by family but
run by non-family members (FB2=1 and FB1=0).  The results are shown in Table 5.  Any specifications
in Table 5 do not show significant difference.  That is, there is no significant difference in performance
between family owned firms run by the family members and those run by non-family members.  Thus,
Hypothesis 4 is rejected.
???
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Table 2: T-Test for Diffence in Means of ROA and AAGR between Family and Non-Family Firms
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
FB1=0   
0.2934434
15.298745
120
0
182
-3.087714
FB1=1   
1.7753225
7.0960265
69
***               
ROA92-05 ROA92-05 ROA92-05
FB2=0   
0.1002276
16.022412
109
0
184
-3.610114
FB2=1   
1.8348207
6.7094284
80
***               
FB3=0   
0.4759872
13.863905
138
0
112
-2.55301
FB3=1   
1.8043967
8.6843331
51
**                
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
FB1=0   
0.35213
8.906336
120
0
137
-2.883374
FB1=1   
1.6852381
9.6283571
69
***               
ROA92-98 ROA92-98 ROA92-98
FB2=0   
0.1838532
9.0726771
109
0
171
-3.510111
FB2=1   
1.7312143
8.8876193
80
***               
FB3=0   
0.5060559
8.3867928
138
0
88
-3.194269
-11.93286
2.0126857
8.0847765
50
***               
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
FB1=0   
0.307378
33.506938
121
0
186
-2.447483
FB1=1   
1.864089
8.8069826
69
**                
ROA99-05 ROA99-05 ROA99-05
FB2=0   
0.1004188
36.004568
110
0
165
-2.79871
FB2=1   
1.9346101
8.1756744
80
***               
FB3=0   
0.5091598
29.982819
139
0
151
-2.090701
FB3=1   
1.8635621
10.402456
51
**                
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
FB1=0   
-0.008834
0.0105967
120
0
172
-1.973581
FB1=1   
0.0121716
0.0017234
69
**                
AAGR92-05 AAGR92-05 AAGR92-05
FB2=0   
-0.003209
0.0023405
109
0
98
-0.339418
FB2=1   
0.0016198
0.0144769
80
FB3=0   
0.0022196
0.0022068
138
0
54
0.5958678
FB3=1   
-0.010325
0.0217866
51
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
FB1=0   
0.0012438
0.0026094
120
0
118
-1.304571
FB1=1   
0.0129465
0.0040521
69
AAGR92-98 AAGR92-98 AAGR92-98
FB2=0   
-0.001679
0.002561
109
0
149
-2.013101
FB2=1   
0.0153197
0.0038245
80
**                
FB3=0   
0.0035705
0.0025065
138
0
70
-0.672603
FB3=1   
0.010781
0.0049348
51
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: **=5%, ***=1%.
FB1=0   
-0.009801
0.0133518
121
0
172
-1.770273
FB1=1   
0.0112173
0.0021125
69
**                
AAGR99-05 AAGR99-05 AAGR99-05
FB2=0   
-0.00361
0.0052609
110
0
186
-1.834151
-1       
0.0124716
0.0022952
79
**                
FB3=0   
0.0009776
0.0045676
139
0
58
0.5371366
FB3=1   
-0.010741
0.0225965
51
???
Table 3: T-Test for Diffence in Means of ROA and AAGR between Founders and Successors
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
successor  
1.41837302
6.42311075
54
0
21
-2.0446071
founder   
3.06034066
7.88968295
15
*                       
ROA92-05 AAGR92-05
successor  
0.00368856
0.00129247
54
0
19
-2.9869689
founder   
0.04271039
0.00220101
15
***                    
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
successor  
1.32701058
9.57364862
54
0
24
-1.9325746
founder   
2.97485714
8.24632093
15
*                       
ROA92-98 AAGR92-98
successor  
0.00032954
0.00271594
54
0
17
-2.6254724
founder   
0.05836777
0.00657558
15
**                      
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
successor  
1.50973545
7.49702704
54
0
19
-1.6723854
founder   
3.1397619
12.1672624
15
RAO99-05 AAGR99-05
successor  
0.00642011
0.00193473
54
0
20
-1.5435754
founder   
0.02848736
0.00252829
15
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Table 4: T-Test for Difference in Means of ROA and AAGR between Family Owned Firms Run
              by Successors of Family  and Run by Non-Family Members
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
1.431825397
6.51061678
45
0
41
-0.87361621
owned by family
run by successors
owned by family
run by outsiders
owned by family
run by successors
owned by family
run by outsiders
owned by family
run by successors
owned by family
run by outsiders
owned by family
run by successors
owned by family
run by outsiders
owned by family
run by successors
owned by family
run by outsiders
owned by family
run by successors
owned by family
run by outsiders
1.999243851
5.820714994
21
ROA92-05 AAGR92-05
0.003864068
0.001273381
45
0
20
0.671304065
-0.029340374
0.050783275
21
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
1.300984127
10.31608792
45
0
53
-0.852377224
1.895782313
5.411569077
21
ROA92-98 AAGR92-98
0.002081232
0.002512088
45
0
35
-0.912938409
0.01545223
0.003332373
21
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
1.562666667
6.834625751
45
0
36
-0.71327662
2.092494331
8.397549907
21
RAO99-05 AAGR99-05
0.005681354
0.002161549
45
0
21
0.686049188
-0.028763831
0.051929069
21
???
Table 5: T-Test for Difference in Means of ROA and AAGR between Family Owned Firms Run
             by Family Members and Run by Non-Family Members
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
FB1=0&FB2=1
1.999243851
5.820714994
21
0
39
0.353471438
FB1=1&FB2=1
1.776297262
7.118288516
59
ROA92-05 AAGR92-05
FB1=0&FB2=1
-0.029340374
0.050783275
21
0
20
-0.848522043
FB1=1&FB2=1
0.012639463
0.0017365
59
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
FB1=0&FB2=1
1.895782313
5.411569077
21
0
48
0.339887481
FB1=1&FB2=1
1.672639225
10.22619612
59
ROA92-98 AAGR92-98
FB1=0&FB2=1
0.01545223
0.003332373
21
0
39
0.011911265
FB1=1&FB2=1
0.015272571
0.004060152
59
Mean
Variance
Obs.
Hypothesized Mean Dif.
df
t stat.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
FB1=0&FB2=1
2.092494331
8.397549907
21
0
35
0.291504824
FB1=1&FB2=1
1.878414044
8.227887563
59
RAO99-05 AAGR99-05
FB1=0&FB2=1
-0.028763831
0.051929069
21
0
21
-0.773392216
FB1=1&FB2=1
0.009988035
0.002232214
59
(2) Regression Analysis
We ran the regressions to examine if large shareholders' strong incentives to control managers are the
reason for better performance of family firms.  The results are indicated in Table 6 and 7. According to the
tables, the family business dummy (FB2) has significantly positive relationship with ROA92-05 and with
ROA92-98, while does not have significant relationship with ROA99-05 and with sales growth (AAGRt)
during any periods.  Therefore, family firms show higher ROA from 1992 to 2005 and from 1992 to 1998
than non-family firms.  On the other hand, the coefficient of Largest_Share in any models is insignificant
in almost all of the models.  In model (9) in Table 7, it is significant but the sign is negative and opposite to
our expectation.  Therefore, shareholders with large equity share do not have a positive impact on firm per-
formance, and Hypothesis 5 is rejected.  That is, family firms perform better because family with large eq-
uity share has strong incentives to monitor managers, while all the large shareholders do not work equiva-
lently.  This suggests that not owning large equity share but family membership does matter.
According to Table 6 and Table 7, some of the variables indicating investment behavior have signifi-
cant coefficients.  In all the models of Table 6, capacity investment (AVEINVR) has significantly posi-
tive coefficients and stability of R&D investment and that of capacity investment (CVRDRt, CVINVt)
have significantly negative coefficients.  In model (3) through (6) of Table 7, AVEINVRt has a signifi-
cantly positive coefficient and CVRDRt has a significantly negative coefficient.  In model (7) through (9)
of Table 7, AVERDRt has a significantly positive coefficient and CVRDRt has a significantly negative
coefficient.  Therefore, in short, the more the firms invest and the less they change the amount of invest-
ment, the better they perform.
Then, we examined if there is any difference in investment behavior between family and non-family
firms.  The results are shown in Table 8, 9, 10, and 11.  Table 8 indicates the result of the analysis on
R&D investment.  In model (8), FB2, the dummy for family firms, where family members are listed in
the top 10 shareholders, has significant at the 10% level, but the sign is negative.  In the other models,
any family firm dummies are not significant.  Therefore, family firms do not invest in R&D more than
non-family firms.
In Table 9 indicating the result of the analysis on capacity investment, on the other hand, FB2 and
FB3, dummies for the firms owned by the family members have significantly positive coefficients from
1994 to 1998, while they have significantly negative coefficients from 1999 to 2005.  Thus, family firms
invest in capacity more than non-family firms from 1994 to 1998, while family firms invest in capacity
less than non-family firms from 1999 to 2005.  Hypothesis 6 is supported only in case of capacity invest-
ment from 1994 to 1998.
Table 10 shows the results of the analysis on stability of R&D investment.  In models (1) through (6),
all the three kinds of family business dummies have significant coefficients, but the sign is positive.  In
Table 11, showing the results of the analysis on stability of capacity investment, FB3 has a significant
coefficient only in model (4), but the sign is positive.  The positive sign is opposite to our expectation,
suggesting that family firms change the amount of R&D and capacity investment more than non-family
firms.  In other models, family business dummies do not have significant coefficients.  Therefore, Hy-
pothesis 7 is rejected.
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Table 6: The Regression Analysis on the Determinants of ROA
Number in parenthesis is t-value.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
Constant
AGE
DEBTRt
EMPt
AVERDRt
AVEINVRt
CVRDRt
CVINVt
FB2
Largest_Share
R2
adj. R2
NOB
(1)
2.45
(1.96)*
-0.03
(-1.77)*
0.00
(-1.09)
-1.17E-05
(-0.46)
0.76
(0.09)
29.50
(4.40)***
-0.34
(-2.05)**
-1.41
(-2.53)**
0.16
0.13
187
ROA92-05
(2)
1.77
(1.25)
-0.02
(-0.93)
-1.66E-03
(-1.56)
1.14E-06
(0.04)
-3.74
(-0.51)
19.76
(2.83)***
-0.48
(-2.41)**
-0.98
(-1.66)*
1.27
(2.22)**
0.17
0.13
180
(3)
3.09
(2.32)**
-0.03
(-1.63)*
-1.77E-03
(-1.66)*
-1.82E-05
(-0.61)
0.45
(0.05)
28.19
(4.20)***
-0.34
(-2.08)**
-1.49
(-2.65)***
-0.02
(-1.57)
0.19
0.16
185
(4)
2.26
(2.15)**
-0.01
(-0.98)
0.00
(-3.86)***
5.27921E-06
(0.23)
-8.44
(-1.37)
20.05
(3.37)***
-0.33
(-2.18)**
-1.10
(-1.75)*
0.17
0.14
179
ROA92-98
(5)
0.84
(0.71)
-5.77E-04
(-0.04)
-2.55E-03
(-3.71)***
1.13E-05
(0.50)
-7.29
(-1.19)
18.71
(3.18)***
-0.36
(-2.38)**
-0.99
(-1.61)
1.21
(2.53)**
0.20
0.17
179
(6)
2.81
(2.52)**
-0.02
(-1.11)
-2.49E-03
(-3.51)***
9.04E-07
(0.04)
-7.88
(-1.27)
19.98
(3.35)***
-0.33
(-2.18)**
-1.19
(-1.83)*
-0.02
(-1.55)
0.19
0.15
177
(7)
3.38
(2.15)**
-0.03
(-1.40)
0.00
(-2.12)**
-4.71E-05
(-1.02)
13.47
(1.26)
32.40
(4.65)***
-4.33
(-4.35)***
-2.09
(-2.03)**
0.29
0.26
182
ROA99-05
(8)
2.28
(1.25)
-0.02
(-0.94)
-2.85E-03
(-1.81)*
-4.07E-05
(-0.87)
14.58
(1.36)
32.89
(4.72)***
-4.25
(-4.26)***
-2.09
(-2.03)**
0.89
(1.19)
0.29
0.26
182
(9)
2.86
(1.69)*
-0.02
(-0.96)
-3.03E-03
(-1.93)*
-5.70E-05
(-1.23)
16.73
(1.56)
33.75
(4.83)***
-5.07
(-4.92)***
-2.16
(-2.09)**
-3.83E-03
(-0.19)
0.31
0.28
180
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Table 7: Regression Analysis on the Determinants of Sales Growth Rate
Number in parenthesis is t-value.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
Constant
AGE
DEBTRt
EMPt
AVERDRt
AVEINVRt
CVRDRt
CVINVt
FB2
Largest_Share
R2
adj. R2
NOB
(1)
0.02
(0.49)
0.00
(-0.66)
-2.61088E-05
(-1.23)
5.45269E-08
(0.08)
0.19
(0.89)
0.02
(0.09)
0.00
(-0.42)
-0.01
(-0.39)
0.02
-0.01
187
AAGR92-05
(2)
0.02
(0.55)
-2.79E-04
(-0.56)
-3.50E-05
(-1.24)
1.30E-07
(0.15)
0.09
(0.48)
0.08
(0.44)
-2.48E-03
(-0.47)
-8.66E-03
(-0.56)
-1.99E-03
(-0.13)
0.02
-0.02
180
(3)
0.05
(2.47)**
-7.40E-04
(-2.78)***
-3.80E-05
(-3.05)***
3.08E-07
(0.76)
5.67E-03
(0.05)
0.42
(4.00)***
-7.56E-03
(-2.82)***
-9.94E-03
(-0.87)
-2.64E-04
(-1.13)
0.22
0.18
177
(4)
0.04
(2.16)**
0.00
(-2.57)**
-4.07E-05
(-3.33)***
3.35E-07
(0.84)
0.00
(0.03)
0.42
(4.01)***
-0.01
(-2.80)***
-0.01
(-1.05)
0.21
0.18
179
AAGR92-98
(5)
0.04
(1.70)*
-6.28E-04
(-2.25)**
-4.03E-05
(-3.28)***
3.53E-07
(0.88)
6.65E-03
(0.06)
0.41
(3.95)***
-7.55E-03
(-2.81)***
-0.01
(-1.02)
3.51E-03
(0.41)
0.21
0.17
179
(6)
0.05
(2.47)**
-7.40E-04
(-2.78)***
-3.80E-05
(-3.05)***
3.08E-07
(0.76)
5.67E-03
(0.05)
0.42
(4.00)***
-7.56E-03
(-2.82)***
-9.94E-03
(-0.87)
-2.64E-04
(-1.13)
0.22
0.18
177
(7)
0.04
(1.95)*
0.00
(-1.07)
-6.18616E-05
(-2.92)***
-4.50E-07
(-0.71)
0.24
(1.66)*
-0.07
(-0.74)
-0.03
(-2.18)**
-0.02
(-1.15)
0.14
0.11
182
AAGR99-05
(8)
0.04
(1.74)*
-3.47E-04
(-1.05)
-6.25E-05
(-2.87)***
-4.59E-07
(-0.71)
0.24
(1.64)*
-0.07
(-0.74)
-0.03
(-2.17)**
-0.02
(-1.14)
-1.29E-03
(-0.13)
0.14
0.1  
182
(9)
0.06
(2.36)**
-3.84E-04
(-1.20)
-5.11E-05
(-2.36)**
-6.18E-07
(-0.97)
0.26
(1.74)*
-0.08
(-0.86)
-0.03
(-2.33)**
-0.02
(-1.12)
-5.41E-04
(-1.93)*
0.17
0.13
180
???
Table 8: Regression Analysis on the Determinants of R and D Investment
Number in parenthesis is t-value.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
Constant
AGE
DEBTRt
EMPt
ROAt
Largest_Share
FB3
FB2
FB1
R2
adj. R2
NOB
(1)
0.06
(5.70)***
-2.63E-04
(-1.61)*
-1.84E-05
(-1.97)**
7.81E-07
(3.11)***
2.12E-04
(0.34)
2.16E-05
(0.16)
-0.01
(-1.17)
0.09
0.06
186
AVERDR99-05
(2)
0.07
(5.67)***
-2.92E-04
(-1.77)*
-1.90E-05
(-2.04)**
7.37E-07
(2.90)**
2.88E-04
(0.46)
-2.0352E-05
(-0.14)
-0.01
(-1.53)
0.09
0.06
186
(3)
0.06
(5.42)***
-2.44E-04
(-1.50)
-1.94E-05
(-2.06)**
7.81E-07
(3.09)***
2.07E-04
(0.33)
1.59E-05
(0.11)
-4.49E-03
(-0.87)
0.09
0.06
186
(4)
0.06
(4.67)***
-2.39E-04
(-1.21)
-1.70E-05
(-1.89)*
8.88294E-07
(3.29)***
-9.39E-04
(-1.04)
8.72E-05
(0.52)
-0.01
(-1.05)
0.09
0.06
179
AVERDR94-98
(5)
0.06
(4.18)***
-2.12E-04
(-1.05)
-1.74E-05
(-1.94)*
8.83E-07
(3.23)***
-9.64E-04
(-1.06)
8.80E-05
(0.50)
-3.82E-03
(-0.59)
0.09
0.05
179
(6)
0.06
(4.01)***
-1.60E-04
(-0.82)
-1.75E-05
(-1.95)*
9.11E-07
(3.36)***
-1.06E-03
(-1.18)
1.28E-04
(0.73)
3.28E-04
(0.05)
0.08
0.05
179
(7)
0.06
(5.54)***
-2.89E-04
(-1.70)*
-1.46E-05
(-1.36)
7.59E-07
(2.43)**
4.73E-04
(1.02)
-5.39E-05
(-0.37)
-0.01
(-0.99)
0.07
0.04
184
AVERDR99-05
(8)
0.07
(5.82)***
-3.52E-04
(-2.06)**
-1.58E-05
(-1.48)
6.78E-07
(2.16)**
5.24E-04
(1.14)
-1.23E-04
(-0.82)
-0.01
(-1.89)*
0.09
0.05
184
(9)
0.07
(5.60)***
-3.08E-04
(-1.82)*
-1.57E-05
(-1.46)
7.36E-07
(2.35)**
4.90E-04
(1.06)
-9.16E-05
(-0.61)
-0.01
(-1.34)
0.08
0.04
184
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Table 9: Regression Analysis on the Determinants of Capacity Investment
Number in parenthesis is t-value.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
Constant
AGE
DEBTRt
EMPt
ROAt
Largest_Share
FB3
FB2
FB1
R2
adj. R2
NOB
(1)
66.3E-3
(4.33)***
-2.42E-04
(-1.08)
-5.30E-06
(-0.41)
1.89E-07
(0.55)
2.33E-03
(2.71)***
-1.90E-04
(-1.00)
-6.11E-05
(-0.01)
0.07
0.04
186
AVEINVR94-05
(2)
0.07 
(4.25)***
-2.76E-04
(-1.22)
-5.48E-06
(-0.43)
1.63E-07
(0.47)
2.37E-03
(2.75)***
-2.19E-04
(-1.11)
-2.98E-03
(-0.42)
0.07
0.04
186
(3)
0.06 
(3.92)***
-2.05E-04
(-0.92)
-4.66E-06
(-0.36)
2.10E-07
(0.61)
2.28E-03
(2.66)***
-1.58E-04
(-0.81)
3.63E-03
(0.51)
0.07
0.04
186
(4)
0.02
(1.19)
3.11E-04
(1.26)
-1.80E-05
(-1.28)
1.97E-07
(0.52)
1.32E-03
(1.40)
9.65E-05
(0.46)
0.02
(2.74)***
0.07
0.04
185
AVEINVR94-98
(5)
0.02 
(1.28)
2.44E-04
(0.97)
-1.66E-05
(-1.16)
2.32E-07
(0.60)
1.29E-03
(1.34)
1.10E-04
(0.50)
0.01
(1.75)*
0.05
0.01
185
(6)
0.03
(1.85)*
1.60E-04
(0.64)
-1.60E-05
(-1.11)
1.55E-07
(0.40)
1.43E-03
(1.49)
4.83E-05
(0.22)
0.01
(1.00)
0.03
0
185
(7)
0.10
(5.31)***
-6.59E-04
(-2.35)**
-2.82E-06
(-0.16)
2.57E-07
(0.50)
2.72E-03
(3.56)***
-3.69E-04
(-1.55)
-0.02
(-2.02)**
0.13
0.10
184
AVEINVR99-05
(8)
0.11
(5.16)***
-6.76E-04
(-2.38)**
-4.66E-06
(-0.26)
1.61E-07
(0.31)
2.78E-03
(3.64)***
-4.39E-04
(-1.77)*
-0.02
(-1.98)**
0.13
0.10
184
(9)
0.09
(4.33)***
-5.07E-04
(-1.79)*
-2.91E-06
(-0.16)
3.24E-07
(0.62)
2.68E-03
(3.48)***
-3.00E-04
(-1.20)
-3.66E-03
(-0.41)
0.11
0.08
184
???
Table 10: Regression Analysis on the Determinants of the Stability of R and D Investment
Number in parenthesis is t-value.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
Constant
AGE
DEBTRt
EMPt
ROAt
Largest_Share
FB3
FB2
FB1
R2
adj. R2
NOB
(1)
-0.61
(-0.95)
0.02
(1.97)**
-2.60E-04
(-0.49)
-1.21E-05
(-0.84)
-0.07
(-1.90)*
-2.72E-03
(-0.34)
0.70
(2.28)**
0.06
0.03
185
CVRDR94-05
(2)
-0.70
(-1.02)
0.02
(1.91*
-2.07E-04
(-0.39)
-9.69E-06
(-0.67)
-0.07
(-1.97)**
-8.64E-04
(-0.10)
0.59
(1.98)**
0.06
0.02
185
(3)
-0.64
(-0.96)
0.02
(1.87)*
-1.35E-04
(-0.25)
-1.14E-05
(-0.79)
-0.07
(-1.91)*
-1.03E-03
(-0.13)
0.62
(2.09)**
0.06
0.03
185
(4)
-0.96
(-1.34)
0.02
(2.04)**
-3.86E-04
(-0.82)
-1.15E-05
(-0.82)
-0.06
(-1.24)
-2.23E-03
(-0.25)
0.80
(2.30)**
0.05
0.02
177
CVRDR94-98
(5)
-1.10
(-1.40)
0.02
(2.00)**
-3.50E-04
(-0.74)
-9.24E-06
(-0.64)
-0.06
(-1.31)
4.72E-05
(0.01)
0.69
(2.02)**
0.05
0.01
177
(6)
-0.91
(-1.22)
0.02
(1.85)*
-2.59E-04
(-0.55)
-1.11E-05
(-0.78)
-0.06
(-1.18)
-8.74E-04
(-0.10)
0.64
(1.91)*
0.04
0.01
177
(7)
0.31
(2.54)**
3.29E-04
(0.19)
1.92E-05
(0.17)
-4.75E-06
(-1.46)
-0.03
(-5.22)***
2.53E-04
(0.17)
0.01
(0.14)
0.16
0.13
180
CVRDR99-05
(8)
0.32
(2.45)**
2.01E-04
(0.11)
1.72E-05
(0.15)
-4.82E-06
(-1.47)
-0.03
(-5.20)***
1.71E-04
(0.11)
-3.89E-03
(-0.07)
0.16
0.13
180
(9)
0.28
(2.25)**
5.31E-04
(0.30)
2.30E-05
(0.20)
-4.59E-06
(-1.41)
-0.03
(-5.24)***
4.67E-04
(0.30)
0.03
(0.49)
0.16
0.13
180
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Table 11: Regression Analysis on the Determinants of the Stability of Capacity Investment
Number in parenthesis is t-value.
Significance levels are using 2-tailed test: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
Constant
AGE
DEBTRt
EMPt
ROAt
Largest_Share
FB3
FB2
FB1
R2
adj. R2
NOB
(1)
0.78
(4.18)***
-1.10E-03
(-0.41)
1.27E-04
(0.82)
-9.30E-06
(-2.23)**
-0.02
(-2.23)**
-3.23E-03
(-1.40)
0.09
(1.02)
0.07
0.04
185
CVINV94-05
(2)
0.89
(4.44)***
-2.25E-03
(-0.81)
1.28E-04
(0.82)
-9.83E-06
(-2.32)**
-0.02
(-2.09)**
-3.90E-03
(-1.62)*
-0.02
(-0.21)
0.07
0.04
185
(3)
0.86
(4.45)***
-1.94E-03
(-0.72)
1.30E-04
(0.83)
-9.61E-06
(-2.29)**
-0.02
(-2.14)**
-3.64E-03
(-1.53)
0.01
(0.11)
0.07
0.04
185
(4)
0.44
(3.26)***
1.18E-03
(0.60)
-3.72E-05
(-0.41)
-6.48E-06
(-2.48)**
-0.02
(-1.68)*
-1.98E-03
(-1.18)
0.13
(1.94)*
0.08
0.05
184
CVINV94-98
(5)
0.56
(3.75)***
-5.40E-05
(-0.03)
-2.68E-05
(-0.29)
-6.83E-06
(-2.56)**
-0.01
(-1.44)
-2.57E-03
(-1.45)
0.01
(0.13)
0.06
0.03
184
(6)
0.56
(3.95)***
-1.05E-04
(-0.05)
-2.60E-05
(-0.28)
-6.87E-06
(-2.60)***
-0.01
(-1.44)
-2.61E-03
(-1.49)
0.00
(0.08)
0.06
0.03
184
(7)
0.54
(3.72)***
-6.96E-04
(-0.33)
6.91E-05
(0.51)
-7.17E-06
(-1.86)*
-0.01
(-1.49)
-6.12E-04
(-0.34)
0.03
(0.45)
0.04
0.01
180
CVINV99-05
(8)
0.65
(4.13)***
-1.67E-03
(-0.78)
5.21E-05
(0.38)
-7.88E-06
(-2.02)**
-0.01
(-1.43)
-1.33E-03
(-0.71)
-0.06
(-0.81)
0.04
0.01
180
(9)
0.61
(4.04)***
-1.32E-03
(-0.63)
5.97E-05
(0.44)
-7.51E-06
(-1.94)*
-0.01
(-1.46)
-1.06E-03
(-0.57)
-0.03
(-0.43)
0.04
0.01
180
??Discussion and Conclusion
This paper examined if family firms perform better than non-family firms and explored what are the
advantages of family firms, using the data on the Japanese electric machinery manufacturers.  We found
that family firms show higher profitability than non-family firms.  This is consistent with the existing
empirical analyses in different contexts.   
It is often pointed out that selecting top management from the pool restricted to the family members is
the disadvantage of family firms.  We found that family firms run by successors from the family mem-
bers perform worse than those run by the founders.  But we did not find any significant difference in per-
formance between family firms run by the successors and those run by non-family managers.  Therefore,
whether managers are appointed from the restricted pool or not does not matter.  This suggests that bet-
ter performance of the founders may be caused by the youth of the firms, and that restricted pool of man-
agers is not the important disadvantage of family firms.
It is also argued that combining ownership and control mitigates agency conflicts and is the advantage
of family firms.  However, we found no significant difference in performance between firms own by and
run by family members and those owned by family but run by non-family members.  This suggests that
combining ownership and control is not the advantage of family firms.  Similarly, it is often pointed out
that founding family with large equity share has strong incentives to monitor managers, therefore, family
firms perform better.  However, we found no significantly positive impact of the equity share of the
largest shareholders on performance.   That is, large equity share by itself does not strengthen monitor-
ing managers.
Other studies pointed out that longer investment horizons of the family are the advantage of family
firms.  We found family firms invest in capacity significantly more than non-family firms from 1994 to
1998, while we did not find the evidence supporting the hypothesis during other periods or in terms of
R&D investment.  We did not also find the evidence supporting the hypothesis in terms of stability of in-
vestment.  However, R&D investment does not have significantly positive impacts on performance in
the regression analyses reported in Table 6 and Table 7.  That is, R&D investment is not a significant de-
terminant of firm performance in our data, therefore, it is not strange to find insignificant results for
R&D investment.
Moreover, taking it into account that Japanese economy did not grow in the 1990s while it has recov-
ered in 2000s, the findings above can be interpreted in the following way.  When economy is growing,
firms invest in capacity whether they have long horizon or not.  Therefore, we did not find a significant
difference in investment behavior between family and non-family firms.
When economy is stagnant, on the other hand, firms invest differently depending upon horizon they
have.  Firms, which are concerned with short-term performance, should decrease capacity investment to
recover profitability.  On the other hand, firms with long horizon may be patient enough to invest a lot in
capacity in spite of low profitability.  If so, family firms may invest in capacity aggressively even when
economy is stagnant since they have long horizon, and because of such investment behavior, they may
perform better.  In sum, family firms have advantage of long horizon, which makes the behavior of fami-
ly firms different from that of non-family firms especially during low growth period.
???
There are several future research agenda.  First, in this study, we defined family firms in terms of
management and in terms of ownership.  In terms of management, the criterion is whether the president
or the chairman of the firm is from the founding family.  However, not only the president or the chair-
man is influential, but also the family members in the board, could influence on firms performance.
Therefore, we need to examine family firms in more detail.  Second, this is a single industry study.  We
will collect the data of other industries and see if there is any difference among industries and if we can
generalize our findings.  Third, we examined only R&D and capacity investment and stability of them as
investment behavior.  However, to examine the effect of long horizon, we need to examine other invest-
ment such as diversification, global expansion, and so on.
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